Notes from Klitschko-Adamek, Gamboa-Ponce de Leon

• What struck me most about Vitali Klitschko's dominating performance over Tomasz Adamek was his intelligence.  Of course, Klitschko's physical advantages and technical expertise are immense challenges for any opponent to overcome, but Klitschko also won the mental game last night, laying traps for Adamek, goading him to come forward.  Klitschko's mastery of the psychological dimension of boxing is what separates him from all others in the heavyweight division, including his brother.
• He did a number of things last night to entice – and then ultimately frustrate – his opponent.  He would keep his hands down, inviting Adamek to throw his jab or quick left hook.  Klitschko refused to tie up on the inside, making sure his opponent would not be too discouraged from fighting at close range.  He would faint Adamek, inviting counters, but then he would step back and counter with his own shots.  Most impressively, he used subtle footwork to control the distance and the action of the fight.  If there was an exchange in the center of the ring, it happened because Klitschko deemed it necessary. 

• Adamek employed a strange strategy.  I thought he would use his foot speed to move around the ring and attempt to pot-shot.  It would have been a tough way to score against Klitschko, but foot speed and movement were the only real advantages that he had.  Adamek also could have gone for broke by rushing Klitschko and waging a war in the inside.  Most likely, the fight would have ended early, but perhaps he lands something hard.  Maybe Klitschko's body gives out, or his face cuts up.  Again, not a high probability play, but at least one that has some odds (however slim) of winning.  

• Instead, Adamek remained in the pocket all night, placing himself in perfect position to receive Klitschko's thunderous jabs and straight right hands.  He didn't use lateral movement at all and advanced only in straight lines.  Short of holding his gloves down by his sides, this style gave him, perhaps, the lowest possible probability of winning.  It's tough to tell what Adamek and Roger Bloodworth's game plan was.  There's a long history of Klitschko's opponents turning to deer-in-headlights once they taste his power. 

• Unlike his brother Wladimir's match with David Haye, Klitschko was in a real fight last night – one in which he dominated, but nevertheless an actual contest with two combatants.  There were several spirited exchanges throughout the fight and afterwards, Klitschko's face did look marked up on its right side.  Adamek was able to land some jabs and a few very good left hooks.  It was almost odd seeing punches land on Klitschko.  However, Vitali's defense was very good all night; credit Adamek for those connects.

• Klitschko had three punches working last night.  His jab was, of course, masterful.  It was not just the precision of the punch which dictated the fight, but it's frequency; he averaged over 40 jabs per rounds -- a staggeringly high number for a heavyweight, or any weight for that matter.  His straight right hand connected on numerous occasions.  He should have scored a knockdown in the second and did in the sixth.  In both cases, the ropes held up Adamek from landed on his back.  In addition, Klitschko started to mix in a sharp right uppercut in the middle rounds.  Once the third punch was established, Adamek's was unable to defense Klitschko's combinations.  Klitschko did throw a few left hooks last night but it was more of a show punch, not landing accurately or thrown with maximum impact.

• Vitali's performance last night provided further differentiation between the Klitschko brothers' respective ring identities.  Wladimir fights nervously, falling for almost every faint and stopping his offense when his opponent starts to engage. Wladimir also, almost compulsively, ties up on the inside, refusing to fight at close range.  Vitali boxes in a much more relaxed manner than Wladimir does.  He draws his opponent in and wants to fight on the inside.  He is also much more fluid with his combinations than Wladimir is, letting his hands go early in the fight; his brother often takes several rounds to commit to anything other than a jab.  Wladimir is the better athlete and probably has the stronger right hand, but Vitali is the more natural fighter.

********************************************************

• The knock on Yuriorkis Gamboa was his recklessness.  He would rush in with amazingly fluid flurries but would leave himself vulnerable to counters.  He had a history of getting dropped by lesser opponents (Adailton de Jesus, Darling Jimenez).  Sure, he was exciting to watch, but there was always a feeling that Gamboa's defensive shortcomings would be exposed against higher caliber opposition.

• In 2011, against Jorge Solis, an interim junior lightweight titlist, and Daniel Ponce de Leon, a former junior featherweight champion, Gamboa has demonstrated remarkable improvement in discipline, judgment and defense.  Gamboa dominated Solis, knocking him down five times before stopping him, and won practically every round against Ponce de Leon, an awkward southpaw who possesses real power. 

• Gamboa, with trainer Ismael Salas, executed a perfect strategy for fighting Ponce de Leon.  Instead of rushing in, leaving himself vulnerable for Ponce de Leon's counter left hands and right hooks, Gamboa, on Salas' orders, remained in the center of the ring, landing quick, two-punch combinations without getting into exchanges.  The result of this strategy led to fewer fireworks, but a sustained advantage.  Salas correctly understood that Gamboa could win the fight just on his hand speed advantages and accurate right hands.  It was odd to see Gamboa disengage after landed powerful shots.  Surely, the crowd wanted to see more, but it was the right strategy.

• Throughout the fight, you could see that Gamboa respected Ponce de Leon's power.  Instead of keeping his hands low like he had in previous fights, Gamboa's gloves were in perfect defensive position.  He wasn't posturing for his opponent to come forward or showboating to rile up the crowd, but he remained patient, waiting for the right opportunities to throw his punches while minimizing Ponce de Leon's hard, awkward-angled shots.  In the sixth round, in an uncommon display of sportsmanship during a fight, both boxers bowed to each other – a sign that Gamboa has finally met an opponent whom he deemed worthy.  

• Gamboa won almost every round, but he did not dominate.  The punch stat numbers were actually fairly even.  Gamboa's hard right hands were enough to score points but Ponce de Leon landed with several looping left hands and right hooks.  Although Gamboa had a sizable advantage in hand speed, Ponce de Leon craftily timed his opponent and countered fairly well.  He landed a few booming left hands in the fifth round but also took some nasty right hands during the frame.  Ponce de Leon paced himself well and, like Gamboa, didn't try to force action.

• Gamboa's offense consisted of only two punches throughout most of the fight – his jab and right hand.  He dispensed with his left hook, which can get wide, and his uppercut, because he was fighting from distance.  As a result, he didn't showcase his full arsenal, but he was able to defeat one of the best opponents of his career with just two punches, a significant achievement.  

• Although many might knock Gamboa's performance because it was more measured than it had been in previous outings, the manner in which he defeated Ponce de Leon suggests that he has an ability to become a truly elite fighter.  His execution of Salas' game plan demonstrates that he is coachable – a significant achievement for a young fighter who has already gone through three trainers as a professional.  Additionally, he has become a smarter boxer, realizing that high-level pros have the ability to hurt him, especially if he fights recklessly.  His understanding of the finer points of ring generalship and defense raise his potential ceiling.  Originally thought of as a flawed and fluid knockout artist, Gamboa is now much closer to a complete fighter.  If his progress continues in this vein, expect him to rapidly ascend the pound-for-pound lists in the next 12 months.

• For Ponce de Leon, he acquitted himself well in defeat.  After a tough fight earlier in the year against Adrien Broner, where he was robbed of a decision victory, he faced another challenging assignment against Gamboa.  With Ponce de Leon's performances this year, he has erased the sting of the Juan Manuel Lopez fight, where he was demolished in the first round.  A fight against rising featherweight Mikey Garcia would be a great measuring stick for both boxers.  I wouldn't count Ponce de Leon out in that matchup.

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The Failures of the Super Six

Before delving into some of the unfulfilled expectations of the Super Six World Boxing Classic, let me throw out a disclaimer: the Andre Ward-Carl Froch final should produce an outstanding fight.  With that said, the tournament has been a failure.  After two years and ten fights (all on Showtime), the final might not even sell out a 10,000-seat arena.  Even with millions of dollars of publicity, umpteen press conferences, untold numbers of network promos and, often, compelling fights, the Super Six has not penetrated the boxing and sport public commensurate with the time and money outlaid. 

To my eyes, there have been three distinct failures of the Super Six, irrespective of fighters withdrawing from the tournament.  The result of these failures is a subpar competitive event and fan experience.  Although the Super Six was novel in concept with certain errors and growing pains unavoidable, the failures addressed here are all strategic and planning in nature, involving the execution of the tournament.  Each of these failures could have been addressed prior to the commencement of the tournament.   This article will examine how and why the Super Six didn't live up to its lofty expectations and what remedies could be put in place for similar future ventures.

Failure #1  The Inability to Identify the Best Six Fighters in the Division

Not to beat a dead horse, but how does Showtime put together a six-person tournament in the super middleweight division and not include titlist Lucian Bute?  The Canadian fighter had already defended his belt four times prior to the Super Six.  With his rabid fan base, Bute would have ensured that any bout in Quebec would sell out.  

Showtime identified four fighters who were highly credentialed to be involved in the tournament.  Andre Ward, Mikkel Kessler, Carl Froch and Arthur Abraham were all worthy participants.  Abraham, who previously was a long-time middleweight titlist, entered the tournament undefeated.  His inclusion in the super middleweight tournament was certainly sensible.  Ward was an undefeated Olympic gold medalist who was ready to up his competition.  Froch started the Super Six as a beltholder.  Kessler was seen prior to the tournament as the number one fighter in the division.

Andre Dirrell was a debatable entrant in that he had a very limited resume prior to the tournament, having fought as a pro only 18 times against limited opposition.  Nevertheless, Dirrell proved in his close loss to Froch and his domination of Abraham before Abraham’s disqualification that he belonged in the tournament.

Showtime's main failure in the selection of the Super Six contestants was the inclusion of Jermain Taylor, who was viciously knocked out by Froch right before the announcement of the tournament.  As a middleweight titlist, Taylor's reign was mostly smoke-and-mirrors, winning two debatable decisions against Bernard Hopkins, losing earning a draw with Winky Wright, squeaking out a victory against junior middleweight Cory Spinks and failing to inspire in a win against another junior middleweight, Kassim Ouma.  None of his successful defenses came against punchers. 

Taylor's middleweight reign ended unceremoniously in Atlantic City, as he collapsed in the corner of Boardwalk Hall, after eating some punishing right hands from Kelly Pavlik.  Taylor and Pavlik immediately fought a rematch at super middleweight, where Pavlik prevailed again. 

Perhaps Showtime conveniently forgot the decisive 12th round of Taylor's fight with Froch.  All Taylor had to do to win the match was to stay on his feet.  Instead, he collapsed along the ropes from Froch's pressure and right hands.  Taylor did dominate Froch during most of the fight, boxing beautifully at various points.  However, why did Showtime select a fighter for its tournament who had just suffered a knockout loss and who had recently been KO'ed at a lower weight class? 

Interbox, Bute's promoter, claimed that Showtime never presented Bute with a firm offer to enter the tournament.  This issue has not been directly addressed by the brass at Showtime, but the network has since locked up Bute with a three-fight deal outside of the Super Six.  Hopefully, there will soon be the establishment of the real champion at super middleweight, but, after two years and untold millions, the Super Six failed to deliver that fighter.  It's very possible that this whole tournament could be an exercise in establishing the second-best boxer in the division – a substantial waste of resources and time.

Failure #2  Lack of Operational Quality Control for Individual Fights. 

The Super Six was the brainchild of Ken Hershman, the Executive Vice President of Sports and Event Programming of Showtime, the head of Showtime boxing.  Hershman conceived of the round-robin tournament.  He helped to select the contestants and created the rules of the Super Six.  Hershman rolled out the Super Six to the media and immediately received fawning coverage for the vision and scope of the tournament.  

And after initially building the Super Six to "event" status, what did he do?  He erroneously deferred to the individual promoters to set up the matches, sell tickets, and find venues.  This philosophy could have worked had he been dealing with some of the bigger promoters in boxing, such as Frank Warren, Bob Arum or Golden Boy, but instead he was at the mercy of such second-tier promoters as Mick Hennessy, Gary Shaw and Dan Goossen, people who were successful at securing television dates for their fighters, but not ones who had displayed previous track records of selling tickets and building events – you know, promoting.  Hershman did have Sauerland Event in the tournament, the biggest promotional firm in Germany, as well as Lou DiBella, who if he didn't have the established record of selling tickets, he at least understood what a promoter is supposed to do. 

Because of this deferment to the promoters, a series of events decreased fan support and overall enthusiasm for the tournament.  Fights were needlessly delayed (such as Froch-Abraham and Ward-Abraham), short ticket-selling windows hampered attendance (Ward-Abraham, Froch-Johnson, Froch-Abraham) and the selection of fight locations were often baffling (Froch-Abraham in Finland, Froch-Johnson in Atlantic City).

In short, Hershman did not ensure that his network's biggest fights were put in the best locations.  Also many of the selected locations and venues did not optimize the potential attendance or media coverage for the tournament's fights.  Somehow, New York or Las Vegas, two of the three biggest fight markets in America did not host any of the six Super Six matches.  There should have been policies in place for the ticket sale lead time needed for each fight.  Sure, Showtime is not a registered boxing promoter, but let's not kid here.  The Super Six was Showtime's idea.  It did the matchmaking, the marketing, and the media buys for the tournament.  These are all functions that promoters perform.  Why then shirk the selection of fight locations and the need for suitable ticket access for the public?
 

In addition, there was a vast discrepancy among the fighters' respective roads to the finals.  Froch had to fight in England, Denmark, Finland and Atlantic City.  Ward never had to leave California.  Froch did emerge in the finals but he had to fight three of the tournament's original contestants in order to qualify for the semifinals while Ward only had to fight one. 

Failure #3  Lack of Buzz Surrounding the Final Two Rounds.

Somehow, after myriad network appearances and two years of Showtime's marketing muscle, the semifinals of the Super Six were held in the small ballroom of Boardwalk Hall in Atlantic City and a reduced-capacity setup at the Home Depot Center in Carson, California, a suburb of Los Angeles.  The tournament started with packed arenas in Germany and Denmark; the two semifinal matches were fought in 3,000-seat venues.  The disappointing attendance of the tournament and the inability to select venues worthy of the Super Six's "event" status are the largest failures of the tournament.

If Andre Ward and Carl Froch were not proven ticket sellers before the commencement of the Super Six, their impressive performances throughout the tournament should have helped to build buzz for the semifinals and finals of the two-year event.  The fighters themselves have not disappointed.  Yet, enthusiasm for the tournament has waned.  

In America, Showtime is seen as the scrappy, second-place boxing network, putting on good fights without being burdened by the bureaucracy or largess of HBO, a network often inhibited by its uncompetitive matchups for its house fighters and sweetheart deals with its preferred promoters.  But, this is a vast oversimplification.  True, HBO, owned by media behemoth Time Warner, has a significantly larger budget for boxing and a much higher subscriber base than does Showtime.  However, Showtime is owned by CBS, a huge media conglomerate in its own right.  Additionally, Showtime is not some new player in the boxing arena; it has been one of the larger players in the sport for over 20 years. 

Scrappy becomes less enchanting when a network fails to execute its vision.  Showtime has the same access to the boxing media that HBO does.  They are based in New York like their rival is.  It has access to the best labor pool in the United States.  Yet, the network's boxing infrastructure is poor.  It lacks the skill and expertise to build fighters.  HBO Boxing's ability to tell stories, whether it be a countdown show, a pre-fight piece or its 24/7 show, is unsurpassed in the industry.  HBO viewers could tell you all you needed to know about Arturo Gatti or Bernard Hopkins.  Showtime has had some great fights recently, but what do we know about Israel Vazquez's or Jose Luis Castillo's life?  It's not as if Showtime hasn't tried to build fighters who appear on its network, it just hasn't had much success in creating resonant, lasting stories.  Additionally, many of Showtime's taped pieces seem perfunctory.  Its Fight Camp 360 show has focused on some of the interesting back-room dealings of the tournament, but have we really gotten to know the fighters?  Why haven't they become bigger names? 

Until 2011, Showtime hadn't been seriously considered for broadcasting the mega-bouts in American boxing over the last decade.  Previously, the network had abandoned its pay-per-view platform and didn't demonstrate the same expertise at handling big events that HBO did.  This year, only by agreeing to include other marketing and promotional assets from the CBS portfolio was Showtime able to land Pacquiao-Mosley and Cotto-Mayorga.  Curiously, these same assets have not been deployed for the Super Six, which soaks up an enormous amount of Showtime's boxing budget and, conceptually, is the biggest event that the network has staged in years.  The lack of vision in this instance is stunning.

Similarly, why didn't Showtime negotiate with big venues like Madison Square Garden, Staples Center or the MGM Grand to host the semifinals and finals of the tournament, ensuring additional marketing muscle and media coverage?  (MSG was undergoing some construction but the example is just illustrative.)  Sure, I like Atlantic City as much as the next guy, by nothing screams "event" more than New York City or Las Vegas. These locations signify that something important is happening in boxing.  MSG and MGM do a great job of promoting their fights and helping to get butts in the seats.  For good or for bad, Atlantic City has the reputation of securing solid, second-tier fights.  Is that what the Super Six is?  Is that what Showtime worked two long, hard years for – a solid, second-tier fight?

The Super Six has suffered from a branding problem in the tournament's later stages.  Yes, the initial three press conferences at the inception of the tournament, with the six fighters lining up on one stage, created powerful visuals and excited boxing fans, but Showtime has lost its bold footing as the Super Six has progressed.  What specifically has Showtime done to raise the awareness of the tournament's final, beyond its traditional marketing efforts?  The innovation and boldness of the initial Super Six concept has given way to Showtime's traditional and staid marketing efforts.  Where is the passion?   Again, Showtime created the vision and framework of an exciting new paradigm for boxing, yet Showtime's execution of the event has seen it fizzle into mediocrity.  Showtime didn't think big for the conclusion of the tournament.  They went with adequate – in terms of marketing, vision, location and venue.

Somehow, NBC, which had previously extracted itself from the boxing business, was able to sell out Caesar's Palace in Las Vegas for the first season finale of its Contender Series.  Prior to the show, no one knew who Peter Manfredo or Sergio Mora was, yet NBC (and a fledgling promoter) created a successful final event.  The network realized that a novel concept needed to build a considerable buzz to deliver commensurate ratings for its finale.  NBC, unlike Showtime, figured out that the conclusion of its tournament needed to be in Las Vegas.  

In terms of building special events, Showtime doesn't have the same number of eyeballs that NBC does – but CBS, its corporate parent and sister network, sure does.  HBO, with only its pay subscription model, has mastered how to stage big events.  Additionally, Showtime has had two years to promote the Super Six fighters and tell their stories.  In totality, the lack of fanfare for the Super Six final is stunning and speaks poorly of Showtime's vision and creativity.

Ultimately, the fight between Ward and Froch should be memorable, but the legacy of the Super Six will be one of failed execution and diminished returns.  Hershman has been quoted as saying that he would certainly consider staging another Super Six in a different weight class, but the first one was far from a resounding success.  The network must take a long, hard look at its boxing strategy.  If it wants to be a secondary network that shows competitive fights from time to time, the status quo could suffice.  However, if Showtime's desire is to be one of the premier destinations for global boxing events and an innovator within the sport, it's time to build a better brand, one whose default settings aren't frugality and complacency.  A little more pride would be a good place to start as well. 

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Steve Cunningham -- a Champion in Exile

Over the last century, there has been a long tradition of Americans leaving for Europe to earn a better livelihood.  American blues and jazz greats often found more supportive audiences for their music across the Atlantic.  During the Red Scare in the '50s, many screenwriters and directors were blackballed from Hollywood and found work on the Continent.  Since World War II, Europe has been rife with American engineers, financial professionals, industrialists, speculators and educators.  In sports, U.S. athletes have plied their trades in Europe for generations, including top soccer talent and second-tier basketball players.  

In modern boxing, elite-level cruiserweights go to Germany for their most lucrative opportunities.  In the recent history of the division, two promoters have dominated: Don King from America and Sauerland Event from Germany.  As King's influence has waned in the sport, the balance of power in the division has shifted to Sauerland, whereby fighters from all over the world come to Germany for their best financial prospects.  Just in the last five years, title fights have been waged in Germany featuring American, Canadian, Panamanian, Cuban, Russian, English, Israeli, Argentine and, of course, German boxers. 

Steve Cunningham is no stranger to Germany.  Later this year, Cunningham, a two-time cruiserweight champion from America, will make his fourth ring appearance in Germany, facing Cuban defector Yoan Pablo Hernandez.  For Cunningham, Germany has become his de facto home base for prizefighting; he is even promoted by Sauerland, after boxing previously for King.  

Cunningham's life story is unique among modern American fighters.  Originally from Philadelphia, he enlisted in the navy after high school.  Stationed in Virginia, he learned to box while in the service.  After his enlistment ended, he competed in amateur tournaments, eventually winning the National Golden Gloves in 1998 at 178 lbs.  As a professional, he didn't launch his career in the boxing hotbeds of Philadelphia or New York, but he trolled around the lightly-regarded southeastern United States circuit, fighting in Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia. 

Taking the nickname "USS," which references his time in the navy aboard the USS Enterprise, Cunningham’s career has been as itinerant as a sailor, docking in ports like South Africa, Poland and Germany for some of his biggest fights.  He has fought only once in his hometown, and that was in 2003. 

In fact, only one of Cunningham's fights has even been televised live in America – his 2008 battle with Tomasz Adamek, which appeared on Versus, a second-tier sports network with a limited boxing pedigree.  The fight was a tremendous showcase for Cunningham's tenacity and technical acumen.  Even though Cunningham lost a split decision, many thought he won the fight, despite suffering three knockdowns.  After the strong showing against Adamek, Cunningham expected additional domestic opportunities (especially a rematch with Adamek), yet no major fights materialized.

From 2007 to early 2010, which were his last three years under Don King, Cunningham fought only four times.  During this period, King was promoting fewer cards and he was unable to persuade the best European cruiserweights to fight in America.  Sadly, Cunningham was spending much of his prime away from the ring. 

For most American boxers, the prospect of fighting for a German-based promoter would run counter to their hopes and dreams.  Fighters want to become stars in the U.S.  They dream of appearing on HBO.  They want to be recognized when they walk through the streets.  But already 34, Cunningham had more basic needs.  He wanted to regain his title, stay active and make some decent paydays before retiring.  His subsequent promotional contract with Sauerland made perfect sense for where he was in his career.

As Cunningham's promotional fortunes turned, he made a key change in his boxing regimen.   He hooked up with Naazim Richardson, a fellow Philadelphian and one of the world's most well-regarded trainers.  (Richardson also trains Bernard Hopkins and Shane Mosley).  Together they have had a promising start to their union, with Cunningham beating Troy Ross, a tough Canadian fighter, to reclaim the cruiserweight title and Enad Licina, a mandatory challenger from Germany.

   

Should he defeat Hernandez in October, Cunningham could find himself with several attractive options.  A rematch and title unification fight against German Marco Huck, whom he beat in 2007, would be the biggest fight in the division.  Additionally, lucrative bouts could materialize against the rugged Denis Lebedev of Russia, or even Antonio Tarver, if he remains at cruiserweight.

For Cunningham, being a two-time cruiserweight champion has not yielded untold riches or mass appeal.  He has fought most of his major bouts in far-flung outposts in relative anonymity.  However, he has made a living and beat the odds to become a champion.  Throughout his career, Cunningham has delivered memorable performances and never turned in an effort any less than professional.  He will retire with his name etched in the boxing record books and a reputation beyond reproach.

One gets the feeling that there will be a fruitful second act of Cunningham's career after boxing.  In the Philadelphia fight community, he is a popular figure.  He is very generous with the media and a great interview.  A devout Christian, Cunningham has pursued varied interests outside the ring.  He owns a pizzeria in West Philadelphia.  He has done some male modeling and he is currently designing a boxing-related comic book.  Should he remain in the sport, he would be a natural as a commentator. Yet Cunningham, with his rich life experiences and multitude of interests, could proceed in several directions.  Acting?  Drawing?  Preaching?  Community Organizing?  None of these options would be surprising.  Hopefully, his second career will be closer to home.   

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Notes from Berto-Zaveck

• The Andre Berto-Jan Zaveck fight was shaping up to be a barnburner.  Through five rounds, both fighters committed to vicious power shots.  If Berto's combinations were flashier, Zaveck's were more accurate.  Berto was able to open up cuts on both sides of Zaveck's face, especially a particularly nasty one over his right eye.  After the fifth, Zaveck's corner wouldn't let its fighter continue and Berto scored the stoppage victory.

• I scored the fight three rounds to two for Zaveck.  Berto captured the first two rounds by getting off first and landing the harder shots.  Rounds three and five were close, with both fighters connecting with numerous power shots.  I gave those rounds to Zaveck, whose right hand counters and uppercuts landed frequently.  However, three and five could have gone either way.  Zaveck easily won the fourth with his high connect percentage and success in landing power shots. 

• The trajectory of the fight was favoring Zaveck.  After a dominant first two rounds, Berto's defense started to deteriorate.  In all, Zaveck was able to land over 40% of his shots, most of those power punches.  That ratio did not bode well for Berto over the second half of the fight. 

• It seems as though Berto has found his ring identity.  Through his development, he has fought in many different styles, from slick boxer to aggressive infighter.  Against Victor Ortiz and now Zaveck, Berto has settled on a pocket fighter who favors power shots and combination punching.  He leaves himself vulnerable to counters but he has extreme faith in his power (even if it may be misplaced).

• In a recurring theme of his career, Berto ignored his trainer, Tony Morgan, in this case as early as the second round.  Morgan implored his fighter to incorporate more "ins and outs" after the second round, meaning, hit and get out of range.  Instead, Berto stood right in front of Zaveck, exchanging power shots.  After the fourth round, Morgan demanded that Berto box more, yet Berto continued in the same fashion.

• Berto had advantages in foot speed and lateral quickness, but he refused to capitalize on these strengths.  He was determined to wear Zaveck down with his strength and power.  It's inconclusive whether this strategy would have been enough to secure the victory.  The fight could have been much easier for Berto, had he incorporated more jabs and used the ring to his benefit.

• Nevertheless, whatever strategic deficiencies that Berto exhibited throughout the match, he should be credited fully for the victory.  His repeated right hand bombs and right uppercuts caused the stoppage.  If he followed Morgan's advice, perhaps he doesn't win the fight.  

• Berto threw a much-improved uppercut.  In the past, he would need considerable space to execute that punch.  Here, he was able to land it repeatedly and powerfully during close exchanges.

• Defensively, Berto must improve to have any shot at defeating truly elite fighters.  He is tardy in returning his hands to a defensive position after throwing punches.  He also squares up to his opponents, giving them more of a target.  This flaw makes him very susceptible to left hooks and also explains why the southpaw Victor Ortiz was able to have so much success against him. 

• Berto fights like a man who is in love with his power.  He can't wait for his opponent to throw, because he believes it will give him opportunities to land his harder shots.  This confidence in his power may be misguided.  He has yet to knockout an elite-level opponent.  It seems as if fighters with good chins can take his shots fairly well.  It will be fascinating to see whether Berto's supreme belief in his power will lead to his undoing in future fights.

• Additionally, Berto's refusal to listen to his corner is a serious problem which will further manifest against elite opponents.  Morgan was giving Berto sound advice, yet Berto almost willfully ignored it.  Give Morgan credit, his corner was much more controlled this fight.  There weren't six voices yelling at Berto with different strategic imperatives.  Morgan's instructions were lucid and relevant.  However, if Berto doesn't trust Morgan implicitly, his ultimate success as a fighter will be hindered.  Even with the victory, it may be time for Berto to change trainers, or bring in another voice as the lead.  When the rough waters come, Berto is going to need a trainer for whom he has ultimate respect.  Berto's professional relationship with Morgan is a chink in his armor.  It leaves him vulnerable in future, tough fights.  

• For Zaveck, he demonstrated a lot of character in the loss.  As an unknown quantity for U.S. television audiences, Zaveck showed that he clearly belonged against a top-five welterweight.  Zaveck displayed a great chin and demonstrated the ability to block and parry a number of shots.  However, his style of high-volume combinations and power counters leads to a lot of opportunities for his opponents.  Even though Zaveck was doing well in the fight, quite possibly he could have been losing by three rounds. 

• Furthermore, if he is prone to cuts, his style of fighting could directly lead to difficulties in future contests.  To this point in his career, Zaveck hasn't demonstrated an alternate style that allows him to win fights against good opponents.  If he can only win by aggressive infighting, the stoppage against Berto could be a harbinger of things to come.  It would be wise for Zaveck to hire a top-tier cut man.  Clearly, his cuts against Berto were debilitating, but with someone like Joe Souza or Miguel Diaz in the corner, could his night have been salvaged?  

• Hopefully, Zaveck's performance will enable him to get fights against the elite welterweights in the world.  He would make a great opponent for rising junior welterweights such as Amir Khan or Devon Alexander.  He fights in a TV-friendly style and showed that he can compete with the best in the division.

• HBO did not have a good night.  The network's opening fight was an uncompetitive showcase bout for rising prospect Gary Russell, Jr.  The fight was so boring that Max Kellerman and Roy Jones decided to engage in an incoherent esoteric debate about ring identities.  Bob Papa, who is usually solid in calling the fights, did not forcefully assert himself to keep the broadcast centered on the (in) action at hand. 

• Additionally, in the main event, Kellerman insisted on comparing Berto to former champion Meldrick Taylor.  The comparison wasn't apt in that Taylor was much slicker and had significantly faster hands than Berto does.  The two also had far different ring temperaments.  Nevertheless, Kellerman continued to ramble on without Papa reining him in.  Papa, who's not primarily a boxing guy, may not have had the specific ring knowledge to call Kellerman on his B.S. or was too deferential to his analyst.  Nevertheless, as the play-by-play man, he is responsible for the directional course of the broadcast.  If an analyst veers off track, it is his job to refocus the crew.  

• The broadcast ended with a strange declaration from Kellerman, who disparaged some of the practices of his own network. He acknowledged (rightfully so) that HBO was perhaps too cozy with manager Al Haymon (Haymon had both Berto and Russell fighting on the broadcast).  He admitted that the Russell fight was not of HBO quality and that Haymon has wielded significant influence over the network. 

• Perhaps Kellerman was instructed to fire a public salvo at Haymon.  Maybe, with the president of HBO Sports resigning, the new interim regime was trying to assert itself and respond to industry criticism.  Although Kellerman's remarks were heartfelt and correct in terms of substance, calling out a manager to end a broadcast (not a fighter or even a promoter!) seems like small potatoes.  Yes, HBO has some issues to address with its boxing program, but last night's public flogging of Haymon seemed out of place and beneath the dignity of the "Network of Champions."

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Legacy Building for Ricky Burns

Like most champions, Ricky Burns has a choice: he can make comfortable defenses or he can fight the best.  Each option has its allures.  Stringing together a relatively non-threatening run of defenses solidifies the bank account and increases a fighter's longevity in the sport.  Fighting the best leads to more acclaim, the potential for wider appeal and a significant amount of downside risk.  However, on a more primal level, fighting and, perhaps, defeating the highest caliber of opposition is a point of personal pride.  Although there have always been protected champions in the history of boxing, no fighter enters the ring and says "I want to be among the best in my division."  He wants to be the top dog.

Of course, these are the things that fighters tell themselves.  There are numerous counterexamples.  Felix Sturm had the opportunity to face Sergio Martinez, Kelly Pavlik or Arthur Abraham and decided to fight none of them.  Lucian Bute has made nine super middleweight defenses and somehow has not faced a top-five opponent in his division.  At a certain point, boxers have the ability to dictate to their management and promoters whom they would like fight.  When scanning the records of current titlists in boxing, realize that those who have not faced notable fighters are complicit in their lack of quality opposition.  Yes, managers and promoters can be reticent to put their fighters at risk, but ultimately, a boxer's team works for him.  

Ricky Burns could follow the path that many fighters have chosen, looking to cash in on their title belt.  He could make a series of domestic defenses against the bottom level of the permissible opponents of his sanctioning organization.  Every 12 months he would make a mandatory defense, but even mandatories often aren't among the best in the division; they are just the ones who happen to pay sanctioning fees.  In this scenario, Burns would please his local fans and make good money both at the gate and through Sky TV's licensing fees.  

But Burns has decided to forgo this easier route.  Instead of filling arenas in Glasgow, Scotland against "opponents," his next fight will be in America, meeting one of its best young boxers, Adrien Broner.  In addition, the bout will take place in Broner's home town of Cincinnati.  This will be the most difficult assignment of Burns' career. 

Broner, already a top-five junior featherweight, will have plenty of advantages in this fight.  He will have the support of the local crowd.  He fights under Golden Boy, one of the largest promotional outfits in the world.  Also, it is because of him that HBO will be televising the fight on Thanksgiving weekend, a rarity for American boxing networks.

Burns' promoter, Frank Warren, is no upstart, having been elected to the International Boxing Hall of Fame; Warren is universally acknowledged as the most successful British promoter in modern boxing.  As a seasoned pro, Warren fully understands the inherent difficulty of winning decisions on foreign soil. 

The Burns-Broner matchup rejects Warren's typical modus operandi.  When Warren had Ricky Hatton and Joe Calzaghe, he made them into such significant British boxing attractions that overseas titlists had to come to the U.K. to make their biggest purses.  Kostya Tszyu was the unified junior welterweight champion who had made eight defenses against names like Julio Cesar Chavez and Zab Judah, but Tszyu had to face Ricky Hatton in Hatton's home city of Manchester.  Jeff Lacy was a dynamic, American titlist who had the backing of Showtime, yet Lacy had to go to the U.K. to meet Joe Calzaghe.  Warren is intimately familiar with the advantages that boxers have fighting in their home markets.   

At first, Warren attempted to guide Burns' career down a similar path, staging Burns' first two defenses in Scotland.  The opposition was mediocre but Burns did his part by selling tickets and coasting to easy victories.  However, Burns wanted more; he wasn't content with uncompetitive title defenses.  He implored Warren to set up a unification fight with South African titleholder Mzonke Fana.  The two sides couldn't agree on money or a location and the fight was never realized.  Warren next fed former titlist Nicky Cook (who also fights under his promotional banner) to Burns.  Cook had a bum back and failed to make it out of the first round.  By now, Burns was hearing claims that he was a protected fighter but he was determined to show his mettle and face the best at junior lightweight. 

The suggestion that Burns should fight Broner had been tossed around in media circles for several months.  For a variety of reasons, there was a strong possibility that the fight would not come to fruition.  In terms of a basic professional relationship, Warren and Golden Boy have had their difficulties in the past, with Hatton, Calzaghe and Amir Khan having left Warren for Golden Boy. 

Additionally, because of the five-hour time difference, U.K. television most likely would pay significantly less for a Burns fight in U.S. primetime than it would if it took place in the traditional time slots for British audiences.   The time zone difference would suppress Burns' viewership in his home market, hurting his ability to retain and grow his domestic fan base.  But Burns insisted on the fight.  Without his desire to face the best, and make the aforementioned promotional/financial sacrifices, the fight most likely would not have been made.  

Burns-Broner should be an interesting stylistic matchup.  Broner will have advantages in power and athleticism but Burns can win rounds based on activity level and consistency.  When Burns won his title against previously undefeated Roman Martinez, Martinez featured substantially more power, yet Burns continually bested him with his solid jab, straight right hand and sneaky right uppercut.  Martinez did show that Burns' could have a vulnerable chin, knocking him down in the first and staggering him on a few other occasions.  Broner, who possesses legitimate power, will have the opportunity to test Burns' chin.  If Broner gets off first and fights aggressively, he could have a real chance to score a knockout.  However, if he waits for perfect opportunities to counter, the steady punch output of Burns will put him in the hole.  

For Burns, a victory over Broner would provide more cache within the sport.  An underdog against Martinez, Burns is seen by many as an overachiever.  He has already lost twice (although both were several years ago), with one defeat coming against the limited Carl Johanneson.  By defeating Broner, he would change the trajectory of his career, giving Warren and his management team the confidence to put him in larger fights.  If Burns wins, he no longer is the local underdog who won a title; he now becomes a much bigger attraction in the sport, commanding larger purses and greater opportunities.

  

Fundamentally, the win would be the ultimate validation for Burns' belief in himself as a fighter.  It would have been easy for him to live off his title for a few more years, challenging himself only when a mandatory was necessary.  However, by facing Broner, Burns' approach allows the possibility of something more.  Even if Burns loses in a competitive match, he will show the world over that he is not a Sturm, facing overmatched opposition with the deck stacked in his favor.  No, the boxing community will simply know Burns as one thing, a boxer who seeks out the best in the world – in short, a real fighter.

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