Thursday, December 12, 2013

Broner-Maidana: Keys to the Fight

An intriguing boxer vs. slugger matchup takes place on Saturday in San Antonio as undefeated welterweight titlist Adrien Broner (27-0, 22 KOs) faces Argentine banger Marcos Maidana (34-3, 31 KOs). For Broner, this fight is the opportunity to cement his status as one of the key players in the sport's glamour division and a major building block of American boxing. With a win, Maidana can earn his first outright world title and obtain the best victory of his career. Below are the keys to the fight. My prediction will be at the end of the article. 

1. Maidana's Right Hand. 

Maidana's knockout weapon is the real drama in this matchup. Can Broner take a shot from a hard-hitting welterweight? To this point, Broner's beard, when tested, has been superb. His willingness to trade in the center of the ring stems from his ability to use his reflexes, defensive technique and body to minimize damage from big punches. However, Broner has only faced feather-fisted Paulie Malignaggi at welterweight and skipped the 140-lb. division entirely. Taking a good shot from a lightweight is an entirely different proposition from absorbing a full-fledged welterweight punch. Although Maidana wasn't able to dent Devon Alexander's chin at 147, it's clear from his outings versus Josesito Lopez and Jesus Soto Karass that he still packs a serious punch. 

But will Maidana be able to land his right hand, and how often? Let's be frank. Maidana's right hand is powerful, but it's slow. Alexander skated away from it almost their whole fight. Soto Karass and Lopez, to say nothing of Victor Ortiz or Amir Khan, had never been known for their defensive prowess. It's clear that Broner's team will be planning to take away Maidana's punch; it will be up to the Argentine to put himself in the correct positions to land it, which will not necessarily be an easy task against a defensively responsible opponent. 

2. Broner's Counters.

Here's where the sledding gets rough for Maidana. If he loads up or telegraphs the right hand, Broner has a series of counters to thwart him. Broner could trade right hands; his would get there first. He could counter over the top of it with a left hook. If Maidana lunges in to throw shots (which often happens), Broner could counter with his right or left uppercut. In addition, Broner could easily slip a Maidana right hand and dig a left hook to the body. Although it's unclear if Broner has true one-punch knockout power at welterweight, his punches will definitely be hard enough and accurate enough to give Maidana pause before throwing too many right hands.

The answer for Maidana might be to shorten up his right hand and to establish his other punchers early in the fight. Should he have success in the initial rounds, his swing-for-fences right hands might be there later in the fight. 

3. Broner Will Give The Body; Take It. 

Broner's considerable defensive gifts are almost all utilized to protect himself from flush head shots. Using the Philly shell defensive style which limits his exposure to the other fighter, Broner has an array of rolls, spins and movements that minimize hard punches to the head. In addition, he's excellent at tying up on the inside when he chooses to employ that tactic. 

However, Broner will give opponents his body. Yes, he'll swat and parry punches downstairs, but often, he'll just take shots to the body in order to protect his head, or to look for opportunities to transition to offense. Maidana can be an excellent body puncher when he commits to it. The inflamed right side of Erik Morales was a reminder of how powerful Maidana's left hook can be. Maidana's body work will be a key to scoring points and potentially softening Broner up for later in the fight. 

Never technically proficient, Maidana has shown some improvement working with trainer Robert Garcia. For Maidana to land successfully to Broner's body, he's going to have to make sure that he has good balance and doesn't reach with shots. He also can't walk in without throwing punches.   

4. Filling The Gaps.

I wouldn't characterize either combatant as a true 12-round fighter. Broner often gives away early rounds as he studies his opponents. When he does go on the offensive, he often fights only in spurts. Maidana has tremendous heart and has willed himself to the late rounds in some brutal wars. However, he's never been one of the elite-conditioned athletes in the sport. He'll take rounds off and can be prone to punch himself out during key moments. In addition, under Garcia, Maidana has not yet found a cohesive style in the ring. Although he has made defensive improvements with his new trainer, his fluidity from defense to offense can often be lacking. Remember, both Soto Karass and Lopez had significant success before Maidana turned those fights around with his right hand. 

If the fight goes late, the boxer who fills in these gaps will be in a better position not only to win rounds, but cause major damage in the championship rounds. What has bothered Broner to this point in his career (thinking about the Ponce de Leon and Malignaggi fights) has been movement and activity. If Maidana chooses to take a few rounds off or only assert himself for half of a round, he will play into Broner's hands, where he can land just a few big punches a frame and steal it. 

Maidana has problems with fighters who have superior hand speed and multiple offensive weapons. Broner will have a real hand speed advantage in this fight. If he doesn't use his jab and lead right hand, that will be an opportunity squandered. In addition, if Broner doesn't engage consistently on offense, he will give Maidana more opportunities to mount an attack. 

5. Broner's Lifestyle.

Will this be the fight where Broner's out-of-the ring exploits catch up with him? Let's be clear; Broner doesn't live a Spartan lifestyle. He's moved up three weight classes in just over two years. No, this wasn't a case of Broner finally meeting puberty. And the jury is still out on whether Broner is a real 147-lb. fighter or just a blown up lightweight who skimps on training. 

At a certain point, fighters who take liberties with their bodies have to pay the piper. Ultimately, all the ring knowledge and skills in the world won't be able to save a boxer if he's not in shape against a good opponent (James Toney is Exhibit A in this area). 

But how good is Maidana? He can certainly outlast boxers who are prone to fade, but Broner gets better as fights progress. Maidana's greatest claims to fame have occurred against chinny or mentally fragile fighters. But this attribute is also not characteristic of Broner. Will Maidana launch the kind of sustained attack that can wear down Broner over 12 rounds? Does he have the ring smarts and subterfuge to land his weapons? Can he keep up a high enough pace throughout the fight? These are questions that he hasn't been able to answer affirmatively against elite talents.

Prediction. 

I'm going with the guy who has the better hand speed and higher Ring I.Q. As long as Broner's conditioning – and consequently, his reflexes – isn’t  shot, he'll see Maidana's bombs from a mile away. And in addition, he'll punish him with quick counter shots. Over time, these counters will dissuade Maidana from making the fight an all-out war.  

Maidana's decision to enlist Garcia and refine his boxing technique suggests that he no longer wants to rely on his chin as a primary defensive technique. In short, Maidana has acknowledged his ring mortality. He wouldn't have been dancing around Soto Karass with feints and jabs if he hadn't given serious thought to type of fighter that he would like to become. 

Maybe the fearlessness of the Maidana who fought Victor Ortiz would fare better against Broner than would the current version, but still, I don't see it. There's too much of a talent gap. I believe that Maidana will test Broner and he'll land a few of his best shots, but there won't be enough of them to dictate the terms of the fight. I think that Maidana will win some early rounds on activity. However, once Broner goes on the offensive attack, Maidana will be a sitting duck for hard shots, the ones that score and the ones that make fighters a little less fearless. 

Adrien Broner defeats Marcos Maidana by unanimous decision, 117-111, or nine rounds to three.

Adam Abramowitz is the head writer and founder of saturdaynightboxing.com.
He is also a member of the Transnational Boxing Rankings Board.
Contact Adam at saturdaynightboxing@hotmail.com
@snboxing on twitter
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Monday, December 9, 2013

Opinions and Observations: Don't Close the Book

Saturday featured seven combined fights on Showtime and HBO and a major title match in Germany. The interpretations and implications from the weekend's action are almost limitless, with upsets, dominant performances and a few disappointments sprinkled in throughout the fights (fortunately, no robberies). However, one theme struck me in particular: fighters who made me reconsider their existing labels in the sport.
 
Think about the action from Saturday. Felix Sturm, a jabber supposedly on the slide, rushes Darren Barker with power shots and heretofore unseen aggression. He ends the fight in the second round. Paulie Malignaggi puts aside talk about becoming a full-time broadcaster and bests Zab Judah with fresh-looking legs and a solid jab. James Kirkland re-establishes relevance after a career marked with missed opportunities and legal problems. Shawn Porter disabuses the notion that he has a sparring partner mentality and takes the fight right to Devon Alexander. Erislandy Lara finally seizes a big moment and dominates Austin Trout from start to finish.
 
What we saw on Saturday was an excellent display of character from these veterans (and a younger fighter, with Porter).  Ignoring the warnings from father time or the catcalls from boxing media and fans, these fighters went to work and performed at stunningly high levels, often reversing recent lackluster or wanting performances.
 
Let's take a look at where these five fighters were a year ago: Sturm had just lost his middleweight title belt on home soil to Daniel Geale in a fight where he was outworked. He would subsequently lose a decision to Sam Soliman, which was later reversed to a no-contest when Soliman failed a drug test. The thought was that Sturm was on the decline. He was being outhustled in the ring and his punch volume had started to plummet.
 
Malignaggi had won a disputed decision against Pablo Cano in a fight where he was knocked down and faded down the stretch. With a history of injuries and public statements about his contempt for boxing, Malignaggi had frequently talked about retirement. That he seemed so comfortable as a broadcasting was perhaps another sign that his heart wasn't into being an active fighter.
 
In a junior middleweight eliminator last year, Erislandy Lara received a technical draw against Vanes Martirosyan, yet another moment where he failed to impress on the world stage. Although many had Lara winning the fight, his lack of punch volume or urgency painted him with the Scarlet "C," which has been the burden of many Cuban boxers – boring, lack of passion, etc.
 
Last December, James Kirkland was in the midst of another round of inactivity, this time as a result of a lawsuit against his former management and promoters. It was his third extended period of inactivity in his career. In addition, by suing Golden Boy, how would he get big fights again? He also talked about leaving Ann Wolfe, his trainer and professional muse. The last time he had left her he was knocked out in the first round; would he even still be a factor in the sport?
 
Porter had been most notable as a sparring partner for Manny Pacquiao and Floyd Mayweather but his in-ring performances had left something to be desired. On the big stage last year against faded, former lightweight champion Julio Diaz, the best that he could muster was a draw. At 25, he was no longer a young prospect and there were troubling signs in the ring. He would often lose focus during rounds and get caught in-between styles. After watching his first fight against Diaz, there was no thought that this was a future world champion. (Porter subsequently beat Diaz convincingly in a rematch this year.) In addition, other young welterweights in the Golden Boy stable, such as Adrien Broner and Keith Thurman, were viewed as far more attractive commodities, receiving the recognition, network support and promotional push that Porter had been unable to obtain.   
 
Perhaps the most important lesson learned from this past weekend is that trends can be reversed in boxing. The purity of mind and purpose can solve a lot of problems. Sturm emphatically declared how important it was for him to regain his title. Malignaggi felt revived after signing with Al Haymon. Porter understood the seriousness of the opportunity presented to him.
 
And in the end, these five fighters, many of whom had been written off recently by the boxing community, provided thrilling moments on Saturday, from Lara's pulverizing straight left hand that knocked down Trout, to Sturm going for the kill to Kirkland's savage beating of Glen Tapia. Porter jumped on Alexander from the opening moments and immediately took Alexander out of his game plan. Malignaggi befuddled Judah with his jab and movement.
 
For many of these fighters, Saturday was redemption. For others, their performances were trumpets to the boxing world announcing or confirming their vitality in the sport. These proud boxers demonstrated that they weren't ready to transition into a lesser phase of their careers: they were still relevant, they could beat excellent fighters and they deserved coveted spots on television.
 
So, don't close the book yet on Sturm, Porter, Lara, Malignaggi and Kirkland. There may still be many important chapters to be written. And even if Saturday's glories turned out to be the last hurrah for some or all, it's important to remember that labels are not permanent in boxing. Intangibles – health, peace of mind, desire, maturity, coachability – continue to lead to surprising results. Labels will – and frankly, should – always be a part of boxing, but let's try to make sure that they are written in pencil or erasable pen, instead of a Sharpie.


Adam Abramowitz is the head writer and founder of saturdaynightboxing.com.
He is also a member of the Transnational Boxing Rankings Board.
@snboxing on twitter
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Wednesday, December 4, 2013

Q&A: Dr. Scott Weiss on Cus D'Amato, Part I.

Saturday Night Boxing recently spoke with Dr. Scott Weiss, the co-author of the book ”Confusing the Enemy: The Cus D'Amato Story" (Acanthus Publishing, 2013). Weiss, a physical therapist and athletic trainer for the United States Olympic Team, has written (along with Paige Stover) the most comprehensive volume to date on one of boxing's most fascinating and enigmatic trainers. Using his experience as a martial artist and former amateur boxer, Weiss delves into the technical, psychological and personal characteristics that helped D'Amato, with his peek-a-boo ring style, shape champions such as Mike Tyson, Floyd Patterson and Jose Torres.

With an extensive background as a researcher and an intense passion for his subject, Weiss successfully pieces together a robust understanding of an often intentionally oblique man. Leafing through archives and conducting scores of fresh interviews with those in the New York boxing scene and friends and family of D'Amato (who died in 1985), Weiss presents a florid picture of post-war New York City boxing, the men who controlled it and how one outcast figure found his own way to the top, often by controversial methods.  
 
Part I of the Q&A covers similarities between D'Amato and Bruce Lee, the mob's involvement with boxing in New York City, Floyd Patterson, the technical and psychological components of the peek-a-boo style and why D'Amato was scared of George Foreman.
 
Interview by Adam Abramowitz:
(This interview has been condensed.)
One of the things that I learned from your introduction was how Cus D’Amato was a seminal influence on your own martial arts training. Can you talk about his initial influence on you?
My first connection was when I heard about the young Mike Tyson coming up in the ranks. Being a boxer and a martial artist, almost going to the Olympics myself in 1988 [for tae kwon do], I knew about Mike Tyson from my training. And being a martial artist, I said to myself, who’s this guy? Who’s his master? So I would say in the early 80s, it was really Mike’s influence that made me track down Cus and find out who Cus was. That was the initiation.
The other influence you talked about was Bruce Lee. As you initially learned more about Mike Tyson and Cus D’Amato, what drew you to his style?
Similar to Bruce, it’s a lifestyle. It’s not just something you do on the side. I lived my life thinking all of those thoughts. I realized that Bruce and Cus did it as a lifestyle, not just as a vocation. That was the first thing that I realized about them that was similar to me.
From there, I realized that Cus and Bruce had a similar idea about how to totally be able to express yourself. For instance, when a fighter really gets hurt, the other boxer would square off on the fighter and start throwing bombs left and right. Cus said let’s try to get into the stance immediately, which is similar to a horse stance, so you can get the same power left and right if you know how to shift your weight correctly.
So it was like putting together the East and the West, and Cus didn’t even know that he was doing it. Bruce epitomized it and Cus was kind of dabbling with it in the West.
Once you moved away from actively competing in martial arts, what stuck with you about Cus? What were some of the facets about Cus’ teachings that drew you to pursue a more exploratory role about his life?
Cus’ style transcended boxing. His whole approach was adopting a lifestyle as I was alluding to before – that idea of adapting a lifestyle of nutrition, training, psychology, the right sleep. Everything that he was saying was so analogous to what I’m doing with the Olympians that I work with right now as a physical therapist. I’ll be at the training center in Colorado Springs while our athletes are at the Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia.
To be able to see how the best athletes train was really a goal of mine. Seeing how Cus trained and how the Olympians trained, there was such a crossover. But Cus was way before his time.
Some of the specifics [of the crossover] were: when you screw up and when you fail at what you are trying to do, getting back into your rhythm is the hardest thing in life. The girl falls off the balance beam and how do you get back up and say, “Holy shit, I just did that. It’s the Olympics. How do I keep going?”  Cus developed the confidence in you. He knew hypnosis. He knew the right training, the right words to say.
What made your pursue Cus in particular as the subject of your first book?
Being a smaller fighter, I liked the style of the peek-a-boo. The rhythm and timing was more offbeat. It was what I did naturally – so those are kind of the stylistic qualities. Also, realizing that what you are doing is more than just fighting, it was expanding on that. I realized that Cus did that naturally, with his fighters always giving everything they can, and taught them to be a complete person first, and a great athlete – that was very important – not just a great boxer. That’s what I liked about Cus.
How did you hook up with your co-author, Paige Stover, for this project?
After being at the Olympics my second time, in Beijing, I talked to Michael Phelps. I talked to Tim Morehouse, a couple of people who wrote their books. After speaking to both of them, I went with who they directed me towards. Paige had done a few things in the boxing world and was really burgeoning at that time. I needed help in editing, expressing and directing the things that I was saying and that I knew so well from the interviews that I did. Paige was a vital part of that.
One theme in your book that you talked about was how difficult it was to track down good information about Cus D’Amato. And how, in your words, that was almost by design. With that said, how did the construct of the fictional narrator come out in your work? What advantages and disadvantages did you see in having this fictional narrator take us through the events of Cus’ life?
Cus lived the life of the immaculate puzzle, and he wanted it that way. I can’t express that enough. That’s what he wanted. Be that as it may, it made it very difficult because when you speak to the people that were around, they knew a little bit of Cus…certain things, even his family members.
It became frustrating at one point. But then I began to understand what was going on in his life. I started to understand the big picture. You know, it was tough to decipher just what Cus was doing. I’m a researcher. In the medical field, you have to have three to four references no matter what statement you say. And I couldn’t do that with Cus. So to write a straight biography to me would have been a falsehood or a fallacy. I would never be able to do a direct, straight biography. 
So that’s why after interviewing so many of his family members and the people around him – 80-something interviews – that’s when I realized I started to see through his kaleidoscope and was able to almost think like him. That’s when I started to be able to put together the truth of the story. Instead of staying, “Cus woke up at this time. He did that.” I decided to put it into a story.
Cus opened his gym in New York in 1933 – the Empire Sporting Club. How did he make his bones or penetrate professional boxing? Could you walk us through Cus’ early years as a trainer?
It was his brother. His brother became a boxer and worked with a manager. His brother worked with [boxer] Yama Bahama. I think his manager was Bob Melnick at the time. After Cus really saw the inner workings of boxing from the side, from really watching it at the Bronx, up at Sunnyside Boulevard, at some of the churches where his brother would box, that was his main injection into boxing.
I think I alluded to this in the book that the first essence of boxing in Cus’ life was through an uncle. His uncle was also a wrestler and gave all the boys boxing gloves and punching bags for Christmas once. That was the genesis of boxing in Cus’ mind. But he realized the inner workings of boxing with what he went through watching his brother in the pros.
How was Cus able to first able to achieve success as a trainer?
Probably in the army. Cus had a way of being so charismatic and he always commanded such a personality that they would say, “wow, this guy knows what he’s talking about,” and they listened. When he was an MP in the army and he started taking his brother’s knowledge and evolving it, he realized that people started to listen to him. People wanted to know how to fight and defend themselves. And Cus knew that his whole life. I think the army was an integral place for Cus to know who he was as a person.
One thing that I learned from your book was Cus’ early involvement with Rocky Graziano [Graziano would later become middleweight champion in 1947]. That’s not a fighter who is closely associated with him these days. Can you shed some light on that relationship?
He was a Lower East Side boy and Cus ran the Lower East Side. And that’s what it came down to. When Graziano came about, they needed a substitute for a fight, and Graziano worked at the Empire Sporting Club – he was fighting for Cus’ Empire Sporting Club. It was almost like a boxing organization that you had to be a part of just to be able to get good fights. Graziano was just a young kid from the Lower East Side – just a good looking kid that everybody knew would knock people out. It was really because he was a Lower East Side boy and he filled in for someone.
Another interesting aspect of the book is your painting the picture of the mob’s involvement with boxing at that time. You talk about how challenging that environment was for someone who wasn’t that well connected.  Could you talk about the specific challenges that Cus faced as he started to get more involved in big-time New York City boxing?
Just look how hard it is these days. To really break through, there are only so many avenues, so many paths. Back then, there weren’t even that many. There were only one or two paths to get to the top of the mountain and if you were road blocked, you had a rough day.
Cus had to let his own fighters fight each other in the stable he had. Or let the fighters in his stable fight the guys who left and were at Gleason’s or other gyms. Go to Europe. Start fighting there. And that’s what Cus needed to do. When there’s not a path, you have to find your own path. That was one of his main pillars in the genesis of who he was. It was find another path. When you’re blocked, you’re blocked. But Cus had a little bit more of a harder time and had to climb a higher mountain, and sidestep some landmines.
Can you shed some more light on the mob involvement? I think a lot of elements of that scene would be very surprising to today's boxing fans.
I’d be in the mob and I would tell you only negative things about Cus. Everybody spoke against him. Everybody was negative. If somebody asked about what’s the book on Cus. The guy would say, “He’s a fag. Don’t talk to him. I don’t want to have anything to do with him. Don’t go down to his gym."
That time after the Depression. It was a really rough time. And people wouldn’t let him in. Every time you poke your head in, and you almost had something, they would push you right back out. Cus needed to go through the back door instead of the front door. And that was simply the milieu. That’s what it was. Everybody was in on it to push you out.  

It would be like you trying to get an interview with Manny Pacquiao after the fight. Everybody else who would be part of the mob, they would get the first offer to talk to him. After that, if he wanted to hang around, maybe you will get it. If not, you’re done. You don’t get anything. You might just get a little piece of something that he said to another reporter. It became very tough.
Let’s talk about Floyd Patterson, Cus’ first big champion. Tell us about the relationship between the two of them. How did it progress through the years and how was Cus was able to guide him to the top?
Cus prided himself on not getting people later in their career after they were champion. He prided himself on getting them as a boy, creating them as a man and making them a great fighter. That’s the example of Floyd. Floyd knew nothing when he started with Cus. He didn’t read or write. He didn’t know how to communicate with people. He was really a struggling kid. Cus loved the idea of making sure that this guy became a man in life. That was really his main goal with Floyd.
Over the years, just to make it simple, Floyd stuck with him as much as he could but then got taken advantage of. [Patterson] had a big meeting with Roy Cohn and one of the big priests of that time, one of the cardinals. They had a big dinner. And long story short, people started to deceive Floyd to make him think that Cus was doing the wrong thing for him.
The guy who helped pull Floyd over the hill to their side was Julius November, a lawyer. He made sure that Floyd had money. He was working for Floyd and Cus and it became a horrible situation. That’s what happened over time. It just deteriorated. People started telling Floyd that Cus was not on his side, and Floyd eventually believed it.
When Floyd was coming up, how was the peek-a-boo style perceived?
It was a big joke. Adam, it was one, big joke. [Matchmaker] Teddy Brenner used to say, “What’s this guy doing, hiding behind his gloves? What is he playing peek-a-boo or paddy cake, like I do with my kids?”
All the media laughed. All the mob media were writing in their pads while they were tilting their hats down, if you know what I mean. It was all a big game in that era. They were making fun of Cus’ little guy. He’s not even a heavyweight! Look at this kid! He’s going to get knocked out by anybody! They were laughing at him.
How did Cus deal with Patterson’s loss to Sonny Liston and how did that affect him as a person?
Right away, Cus wanted him [Patterson] to start getting hypnotized again. Hypnosis was a big point in Cus’ world. Mike [Tyson] used to get hypnotized two or three times a day – before  practices, before fights. So hypnosis was huge. Psychology was huge. Cus called it your own internal dialogue. What you say to yourself the day of your fight is either going to make you or break you.
So as Floyd advanced, that became more and more important. When he lost, Cus unfortunately wasn’t that involved at the time. And he tried to reach out to Floyd but Floyd was on that mountain where I was alluding to before – almost on the top of that mountain believing everybody else. He was just gone from Cus. At the time, Cus wanted to speak to Floyd and Floyd blew him off. They were supposed to meet after a fight at one of the entrances but he never showed up. Cus was there waiting, and he was really, really upset.
He never got to share the feelings and the psychology of coming back and being strong in the second fight. He never really got to teach him and tell him everything that he wanted to…to be able to come back from a huge loss. Again, just like Mike, nobody was there to teach him how to come back from a tough loss. But look at Manny Pacquiao; he came back from a huge, tremendous loss. That’s developing a champion. And Cus wanted his fighters to understand that and learn that.
I know you are big into technique and philosophy. Can you give us a quick tutorial on the peek-a boy style? What does it enable fighters to do well? What are some potential weaknesses? Why did it work well for Patterson and Tyson? Why hasn’t that style carried over to other fighters?
I’ll give you a couple of things on both sides. For the pros, look at the Thai boxers. They are known in the UFC. They are known for any type of hand striking to be the best. It’s called the Art of Eight Limbs. Look where they keep their hands – up high. Keeping your hands up high is one of the biggest things you could do to protect yourself from getting hit in the head.
Cus also believed in tucking your chin. If you really saw Mike as a young kid or Floyd as a young kid, they would be tucking their chin so much into their chest that if you looked at them from the back, you almost didn’t see their head. It was almost like a magic trick. Tucking your chin and keeping your hands up high were very important for any strike to the head.
Another huge positive thing was movement. Cus always said to make sure your head was not in the same spot, if you throw a punch or if you move. That was huge. Throwing a punch and dipping or throwing a punch and slipping to one side, mostly to the left, head movement was really important.
Also, a final big pro of that style was the footwork. It wasn’t so orthodox. There were more martial arts movements, where there was hopping and springing to one side. Switching feet to get your strong side into the uppercut. Jumping to the other side to throw a right, what Cus would say a “6” to the liver or the kidney, a really deep shot. He would constantly move the body.
A negative about the style was you really had to close the gap properly. A shorter fighter, like a Mike, fighting a taller guy like a Buster Douglas or a  Lennox [Lewis], the movements going forward are different than the movements in a vertical plane. Mike worked furiously. Cus called it a “furious concentration” to move forward and dip and weave and only then would you be able to get into a spot where you could throw a punch with your bad intentions.
There was a weakness in closing the gap. There was a weakness to people who could really throw the uppercut or throw a low body shot. And a further weakness was against somebody who weighed more than you and could push you on your heels.
Cus’ fight library is legendary. He used to have all-night screenings and make his boxers watch tons of old fight films. Were there particular fights or fighters that he kept coming back to as influences?
Oh yeah. Off the top of my head, Cus loved Robinson. He loved Ray Robinson’s spinal posture and the way he threw his shoulders into the punch. He loved the technique of Robinson but he liked the movement of Henry Armstrong. Armstrong was a guy that was always dodging and weaving and punching as he moved forward. He’s almost like the Floyd Mayweather of today.
Another guy would be Tony Canzoneri – another lighter-weight fighter that had the power of a heavyweight but he moved like a lightweight. Those are the people who Cus loved. He came back to all of their fights.
But Cus was afraid, and it is true, he was afraid of George Foreman. If you looked at the way that George Foreman punched, and if you stand up and pretend that you’re in a boxing stance, his right hand comes around and underneath. And that unfortunately gets the peek-a-boo fighter in a bad position because every punch is like a clockwise motion. They are like wide, rounding uppercuts. Cus would say, “You’ll never fight George Foreman. Don’t do it.”
Another aspect of Cus’ technique was the array of punches that he would make his fighters throw. When you think of modern fighters, many of them are known for two or three punches, whether it’s the jab or the straight right hand or the left hook. But Cus really worked on seven, eight or nine different punches. He was a real believer in punch variety and punches from different angles. Was this more philosophical in nature?
No, this was actual. He wanted fighters to throw five or six punches in two-fifths of a second. He was timing it. It was a goal of his. Jose [Torres] was the first person before Floyd who accomplished it. Jose was actually able to throw six punches in two-fifths of a second. His point was no matter what fighter you put in front of my boy, you’re going to stand still for two-fifths of a second and that’s when my guy can lay six punches. He really talked about the science of it and the timing of it. Jose was also instrumental in ingraining the peek-a-boo.

What would you say were some of the defensive underpinnings of Cus’ style? 

No matter what punch you threw, there was a head movement for it. No matter what punch was thrown at you there was head movement for it. Head movements were so important. Whatever you threw or they threw, there were head movements. Being defensive and not getting hit was more important than truly being offensive and hitting.

If you’ve ever studied Wing Chun, if there’s a block there’s a punch at the same time. That’s what Cus developed. It was always a simultaneous offense and defense. You are blocking and hitting at the same time. That was a very different piece that Cus had to his style
I wanted to talk about Cus’ psychological techniques.
A lot of fighters couldn’t deal with them.
Yes. But what made him unique in this area? What were some of the techniques that he used and how was he able to have success in this area and prop his boxers up to make them the great fighters they would become?
He wanted and needed all of you, psychologically and physically. If you could give yourself fully to him, you would be able to use all of those attributes and all of your weight into doing the task at hand. That’s what Cus’ goal was – really teaching you to be the best you can and express the best you can with the body you have. And that’s why I love Bruce as well, because Bruce Lee’s whole goal was fully expressing yourself with your body. Integrating whatever worked to make it work for you. And that’s what Cus and Bruce did.
And Mike just happened to have all of the attributes perfectly. Jose had some of them in one direction. Floyd had some of them in the other direction. But when Mike came along, all of the stars were aligned.

Click here to read Part II.

Adam Abramowitz is the head writer and founder of saturdaynightboxing.com.
He is also a member of the Transnational Boxing Rankings Board.
Contact Adam at saturdaynightboxing@hotmail.com
@snboxing on twitter
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Tuesday, November 26, 2013

Opinions and Observations: Pacquiao and Froch

After being knocked unconscious in his last fight, many in Manny Pacquiao's team and family wanted him to retire. After some reflection and a clean bill of health, Pacquiao decided to give boxing another shot. Although inactive since December, he claimed that he felt like a rejuvenated fighter. However, many questions surrounded his comeback: Would he still have the chin to compete at the top level? Did he still have the will to win a war? Were his outside distractions too much for him to perform at his best? 
 
Under these circumstances, it would be natural to assume that Brandon Rios (Pacquiao's comeback opponent), a tough pressure fighter, would want to jump on Pacquiao immediately, testing his resolve from the outset of the fight. This strategy wouldn't give Pacquiao time to build confidence and establish a rhythm. However, Robert Garcia, the hot trainer du jour of American boxing, had Rios come out at mid-range, providing Pacquiao with the ability to set the tempo and fire his best punches. From my perspective, this was an epic failure from Garcia.
 
Instead, the trainer wanted Rios to establish the jab and work on his straight right hand. But Rios was far too slow to accomplish these goals. And at no point in the fight did Rios make a concerted effort to sell-out for an inside brawl. When Rios did his best work, it was because Pacquiao stopped engaging and allowed himself to get tied up. There, Rios did an excellent job of hitting Pacquiao with his free hand in clinches, specifically with his straight right hand and right hook to the body. If Pacquiao were less cooperative, then Rios wouldn't have even had those good moments.
 
What most irks me about Rios' performance is that he wasn't put in the best position to win. I'm not saying that Rios had a good shot, but he had a shot, and that was to make the fight as uncomfortable for Pacquiao as possible. This meant battering Pacquiao on the inside and applying lots of pressure.
 
It's quite possible that Garcia applied some wrong lessons from Pacquiao's last Marquez fight. Yes, Marquez ended things with one shot, but Marquez is and has been one of the best counterpunchers of his generation, not to mention a supremely intelligent fighter. Even with these skills, it took Marquez four fights to put Pacquiao on the canvas. Maybe Garcia thought that Pacquiao was damaged goods – that Rios’ best chance was to wait for a Pacquiao mistake and get him with a clean shot. But I believe that this was a miscalculation by Garcia, a mistake of KYP – know your personnel. Rios certainly didn't possess the same one-punch power that Marquez did. He also lacked the technical ability, accuracy and hand speed of the Mexican master.
 
I'm sure that Garcia saw some things to employ from Marquez's knockout performance. Maybe if he had a welterweight version of Nonito Donaire, who can counter with the best of them, then Garcia's plan could have been put to action. But in the ring this weekend, Garcia had Rios – a limited and crude slugger who is only at his best when coming forward. In Rios' most memorable performances, he went after his prey like a rabid dog. He walked through fire to land shots and kept coming. Against Pacquiao, that dog remained on its leash.
 
Garcia's strategy had additional blowback for Rios in that fighting Pacquiao at mid-range zapped him of his confidence. Very quickly Rios realized that he couldn't match Manny's speed or creativity in the pocket. As the fight progressed, Rios never stopped trying to land, but he didn't display that dogged pursuit of victory-at-all-costs that he did in his best professional moments. Ultimately, this weekend's fight was where Brandon Rios finally became acquainted with the concept of boxing mortality, which took the form of a lightning-fast southpaw with power from the Philippines.
 
Although I had Pacquiao winning via shutout, I don't think that his performance was perfect by any means. On the positive side of the ledger, Pacquiao did an excellent job of using his entire arsenal. His right hook was sharper than it had been in a long time. His right uppercut was also brought out of mothballs and was very effective. These punches were key in forcing Rios to concern himself much more with defense than applying pressure. Rios just didn't know where the shots were coming from.
 
Pacquiao's footwork was also very good. Often darting around Rios after a quick flurry, Pacquiao proved to be very tough to time and counter. In addition, Pacquiao made sure to get no closer than mid-range while the action was in the center of the ring, which further minimized the countering opportunities for the short-armed Rios. Pacquiao was still very offensive but he was also smart (for the most part). If this lack of recklessness made him less scintillating than he was during his prime, it still enables him to have a career at a high level. Trainer Freddie Roach did a nice job of instilling in Pacquiao how important the concept of range was for this fight.
 
However, there were two significant points of concern regarding Pacquiao's performance: occasional defensive lapses and curious decision making. Rios was still able to land some hard shots along the ropes and in clinches. At times, Pacquiao forgot that Rios needed a stationary target in order to score. I have no idea why Pacquiao gave Rios so many free shots during clinches, many of them of the head-snapping variety.
 
This is a major problem for Pacquiao as he heads towards the back part of his career. He'll most likely never be the firebrand who could throw 90 punches a round for 36 minutes. As he ages, he will need moments off during rounds, and he looked like a complete novice during the clinches against Rios. This area will have to be tightened up. Pacquiao also seemed completely disinclined to work in the trenches. If Rios had a free hand, most likely Pacquiao had one as well, yet where was his inside game? 
 
But in the aggregate, Pacquiao put himself back on the big-time prizefighting map with his performance. He'll have a number of options for a major fight next year. However, let's not read too much into his victory. Rios failed to implement the one strategy that could have won him the fight. Absent that, he really didn't have much of a chance. Credit Top Rank for its matchmaking but a defanged Brandon Rios is not a pure barometer of assessing Pacquiao’s current skill level.
 
Overall, I found the fight quite dull. After the first few rounds where Rios felt no urgency to press the action, the bout devolved into a ritual slaughter of an overmatched and underprepared fighter. The second half of the contest had the inevitability of an Alabama-Army college football game or a Brazil-Iceland soccer match.
 
******************************************************* 
Howard Foster ruined a great fight. Let's not couch this in euphemisms or soft-pedal it. He ruined it. George Groves, a sizable underdog, pasted Carl Froch around the ring for many of the early portions of the fight, including dropping him with a beautiful counter right hand in the first round. This was Groves' moment of glory, his professional coming-out party. No longer was he an inexperienced fighter; he was beating the best fighter in Britain in the center of the ring, and at his own game.
 
Slowly, Froch started to come back in the fight, doing good work to the body and landing some quality counter left hooks in exchanges. In the ninth, he broke through and hurt Groves with a right hand that pushed him back to the ropes. He followed shortly after with another right hand and a left hook. Groves tried to counter but got tagged by a couple more clean shots as he moved towards the center of the ring.
 
At this moment, Foster decided to stop the fight. Although hurt, Groves was still throwing back. He was aware of his surroundings. And while his body language was bad and his legs were wobbling, his condition was no different than thousands of fighters who are routinely allowed to continue in a similar state. It was an awful stoppage.
 
Foster made losers out of everyone on Saturday. Groves saw his moment of glory go up in smoke because of a scared ref who lacked that fortitude to let a fight continue. Froch was deprived of a potentially epic comeback, one that would be viewed as legitimate. And fight fans were prohibited from seeing a definitive conclusion to some absolutely stirring action.
 
Quick stoppages in Britain have become an almost laughable problem in the jurisdiction. Whether it was this year's rematch between Kell Brook and Carson Jones or the Dereck Chisora-Malik Scott phantom "10-count," bad stoppages have plagued recent British boxing. Saturday's decision was the culmination of a bad pattern of cutting action short, most often to help the house fighter. And make no mistake; even though both Froch and Groves are Matchroom fighters, Froch was the international meal ticket.
 
I often appear on the Boxing Asylum podcast, where erudite British boxing observers like Kurt Ward, Andy Paterson and Alex Morris frequently bemoan the state of officiating in the U.K. And it's not just one official. It's Foster or Ian John-Lewis or Phil Edwards or Terry O'Connor. Quick British stoppages have continued to intensify over the last few years and the (valid) concerns of the Boxing Asylum group is that these decisions will stigmatize British boxing, resulting in fewer international fights on home soil.
 
The British Boxing Board of Control (BBBofC) needs to realize that these types of stoppages are bad for business. And although developing British fighters are stuck with these local officials, international fighters have no such compulsion to ply their trade under the same conditions. As an example, why would a fighter like Andre Ward want to square off in a rematch with Froch in England if he knows that the fight will be stopped at the first sign of trouble? Meanwhile, a quality American referee like Tony Weeks, Kenny Bayless or Steve Smoger would be more inclined to let the fight last to its definitive conclusion. This is an issue that needs to be addressed by the BBBofC, or the jurisdiction does risk the loss of attractive and lucrative fights. Hometown stoppages happen everywhere, but this problem is pervasive in British boxing. 
 
With that said, a couple of more points about Froch-Groves:
 
I didn't give Groves much of a chance to beat Froch. So let me start by giving him major props for his effort. Groves' past trainer was Adam Booth, a talented coach, but one who is impressed by his own cleverness and cunning. Booth often opts for conservative and technical game plans. With only a short time to work with a new trainer, I expected Groves to continue down the Booth path. I thought that Groves would utilize his legs and boxing ability to take advantage of his foot and hand speed advantages.
 
But Groves' new trainer, Paddy Fitzpatrick, had a startling game plan. He realized that Groves would have ample opportunity to land his lead right hand over Froch's low left or counter with the right when Froch shot lazy jabs. And he wanted Groves to capitalize on this advantage from the outset, and in the center of the ring. He believed that Froch would present his flaws early and Groves' speed advantage could quickly establish the tone of the fight. Fitzgerald was 100% right. 
 
What was most surprising was not Groves' hand speed but his power. Froch, known for having a granite chin, was rocked throughout much of the fight by Groves' right. During the opening frames, Groves wasn't just quicker, but stronger. The SKY TV commentators were wondering if Froch had gotten old overnight, or if Groves was just successful in making Froch look old.
 
And while some on social media were wondering why Groves continued to go for the jugular as the fight progressed instead of boxing more conservatively, two of the judges only had Groves up by one point in the ninth. Fitzpatrick knew that Groves was the underdog and not the crowd favorite. He was instructing Groves to stay on the gas because he knew that the judges could be inclined to favor the champion in close rounds. (For the record, I had Groves up by three points prior to the stoppage.) 
 
Ultimately, one knock on Groves was how he handled himself in the ninth round. By this point of the fight, he couldn't tie up effectively when hurt (he was much better at this earlier in the bout). In the final moments, Groves gave Foster an excuse to stop the match. Instead of swinging back wildly, Groves should have used his energy to tie up, or use the ring to evade more trouble. Yes, he showed a fighter's heart and instinct by firing back, but his actions also helped lead to his loss. With a more just ref, he would have been able to continue, but he was in bad shape and didn't look like he was handling himself well in the ring.
 
Froch has faced perhaps the most daunting slate of any professional boxer of this era and has been in a lot of wars. At 36, it's tempting to say that he's on the decline. But I'm not ready to subscribe to this viewpoint yet. Froch looked just as bad in the first half of his title defense in 2009 against Jermain Taylor as he did on Saturday. Froch just struggles with quicker boxers. In the first part of the Taylor fight, Froch looked like he didn't belong in the same ring as the American. But, as he did on Saturday, he found a way back into the fight with body shots and hard power punches.
 
Froch was in bad shape early against Groves, but by the third round he was whipping right hooks to the body. He may not have won many of the early rounds, but he was investing to the body for later in the fight. In the final moments before the stoppage, it was clear how hurt Groves was. His faculties were lessened, his movements lacked fluidity and his resistance was weakened. Carl Froch was the one who was responsible for that – after being knocked down, after being battered relentlessly. His comeback demonstrated the resolve of a true champion. 
 
I hope that the rematch happens. Both fighters will clearly learn from Saturday. Perhaps Froch underestimated Groves' strength and he will have to use a tighter jab and engage more purposefully. Maybe Groves will fight more in stretches and not enter into a wall-to-wall slugfest. Froch has proven himself in wars and perhaps Groves' path to ultimate glory will be more of a technical variety. Let them settle it definitively in the ring. And give Tony Weeks the referee assignment.

Adam Abramowitz is the head writer and founder of saturdaynightboxing.com.
He is also a member of the Transnational Boxing Rankings Board.
Contact Adam at saturdaynightboxing@hotmail.com
@snboxing on twitter
Follow Saturday Night Boxing on Facebook: